Summarize fundamental security concepts
This objective covers the conceptual foundations that every other objective builds on. If you don’t internalize these, the rest of the exam is guesswork.
The CIA Triad
Three properties every security program exists to protect:
Confidentiality — Only authorized entities can access data.
- Encryption (at rest, in transit), access controls, data classification
- Breach of confidentiality: unauthorized data exposure, exfiltration
Integrity — Data is accurate, complete, and unaltered by unauthorized parties.
- Hashing, digital signatures, checksums, version control
- Breach of integrity: data tampering, man-in-the-middle modification, log deletion
Availability — Systems and data are accessible when needed by authorized users.
- Redundancy, load balancing, backups, DDoS mitigation
- Breach of availability: ransomware, DDoS, hardware failure
Exam trap: Questions will describe a scenario and ask which CIA property is most affected. Ransomware affects availability (you can’t access your data) even though it technically encrypts it. Data exfiltration affects confidentiality. An attacker modifying database records affects integrity.
Non-repudiation
The assurance that someone cannot deny having performed an action. Requires both:
- Authentication — proving who performed the action
- Integrity — proving the action/data wasn’t altered after the fact
Implemented through digital signatures (asymmetric cryptography). The signer’s private key creates the signature; anyone with the public key can verify it. The signer cannot deny signing because only they hold the private key.
AAA Framework
Authentication — Proving identity. “Who are you?”
- Something you know (password, PIN)
- Something you have (smart card, hardware token, phone)
- Something you are (fingerprint, retina, facial recognition)
- Somewhere you are (geolocation, IP range)
Authorization — Determining permissions. “What can you do?”
- After authentication, the system checks what resources the identity can access
- Implemented via ACLs, RBAC, ABAC, group policies
Accounting — Tracking activity. “What did you do?”
- Audit logs, session logging, SIEM correlation
- Essential for forensics, compliance, and non-repudiation
Zero Trust
Core principle: Never trust, always verify. No implicit trust based on network location, device ownership, or previous authentication.
Key tenets:
- Verify explicitly — Authenticate and authorize every access request based on all available data (identity, device health, location, anomalies)
- Least privilege access — JIT (Just-In-Time) and JEA (Just-Enough-Access) permissions
- Assume breach — Design every layer as if the attacker is already inside
Control Plane vs. Data Plane:
- Control plane: Policy engine + policy administrator making access decisions
- Data plane: Where the actual traffic flows, gated by policy enforcement points
Exam focus: Zero trust is not a product you buy — it’s an architecture model. Expect questions about what constitutes zero trust vs. what doesn’t (VPN alone is NOT zero trust).
Gap Analysis
Comparing current security posture against a desired state (framework, policy, or baseline) to identify deficiencies.
- Conduct against frameworks like NIST CSF, ISO 27001, CIS Controls
- Output: prioritized list of gaps with remediation recommendations
- Feeds directly into risk management and budget decisions
Physical Security
Often overlooked but heavily tested:
- Bollards — Posts preventing vehicle-borne attacks on buildings
- Fencing — Perimeter demarcation; height matters (3ft = demarcation, 6ft = deterrent, 8ft+ = serious barrier)
- Access control vestibule (mantrap) — Two interlocked doors; prevents tailgating
- Video surveillance — Detective + deterrent; PTZ cameras for active monitoring
- Security guards — The only control that can make judgment calls in real-time
- Access badges — Something you have; often combined with PIN (two-factor)
- Lighting — Deterrent control; eliminates hiding spots
Deception and Disruption Technologies
Honeypot — Decoy system designed to attract attackers. Detective control — any interaction with a honeypot is suspicious by definition.
Honeynet — Network of honeypots simulating a realistic environment. More convincing than a single decoy.
Honeyfile — Decoy document (e.g., “passwords.xlsx”) that triggers an alert when accessed. High-confidence indicator of compromise.
Honeytoken — Fake credentials, API keys, or data records planted in systems. If they appear in authentication logs or exfiltrated data, you know you’ve been breached.
Offensive Context
Zero trust exists because perimeter-based security failed. If you assume the attacker is already inside your network — which they probably are — then “trust but verify” is backwards. The attacker’s perspective validates the assume-breach model: once past the perimeter, traditional networks offer minimal resistance to lateral movement. Every zero-trust control (microsegmentation, continuous authentication, device health checks) is a direct response to specific offensive techniques.